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REGULATING A STOCK EXTERNALITY
UNDER UNCERTAINTY WITH LEARNING
Charles D. Kolstad'
ABSTRACT
This paper concerns the problem of efficiently regulating a stock externality (ie, emissions are
regulated but the stock of the externality causes the damage) when uncertainty exists and learning
is taking place about the nature of the externality. The tension is between substantial controls on
pollution when little is known about it versus waiting for more information before instituting controls.
Acting soon reduces potential adverse effects; waiting will be advantageous ex post if the problem
turns out to be less serious than expected. The case considered here is uncertainty in how the
pollution stock affects utility. A three-period model is used to examine the question.
'institute for Environmental Studies and Department of Economics, University of Illinois, 1101
W. Peabody, Room 352, Urbana, Illinois 61801 and Department of Economics, University of
California, Santa Barbara. Research supported by a grant from the Research Board of the University
of Illinois and by NSF Grant SES-91- 10325. The paper has benefitted from discussions with Charles
Kahn and Henry van Egteren and from comments by Geir Asheim, Robert Deacon and seminar
participants at the University of Illinois, the Norwegian School of Economics and CORE. An earlier
version of this paper was presented at the 1992 ASSA meetings in New Orleans and the 1991
EAERE meeting in Stockholm.

I. INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty is a dominant characteristic of environmental externalities. Typically we
understand well neither the effects of these externalities nor the costs of controlling them. This is
one reason considerable sums are expended in trying to better understand environmental problems.
Examples abound: hazardous wastes and groundwater, global warming, acid rain, species extinction,
pesticide accumulation, and the list could go on. An additional factor frequently comes into play
having to do with the cumulative or stock effects of the externality. For example, it is not the
emissions of greenhouse gases that directly cause adverse effects; rather it is the stock of these gases
that may lead to climate change. These two aspects of the problem-stock effects and uncertainty-
lead to a tension between instituting control and delaying control. Some in society will desire control
of greenhouse gases before climate change is well understood. Others in society may urge delaying
control until the problem is clearly delineated. If, ex post, the problem turns out to be less severe
than expected then those urging delay will have been proved correct (ex post). If on the other hand,
the problem turns out to be more severe than expected, then delay can be very costly indeed.
This paper concerns this problem of when and to what extent to regulate the generation of
externalities when uncertainty exists and learning is taking place about these externalities. We stylize
the problem, considering two periods in which decisions occur, with autonomous learning between
the periods; i.e. learning that proceeds with time without regard to investments in the learning
process. Thus the regulator acts in the first period, learns (though not all uncertainty is resolved) and
then acts again. The decision variable for the regulator is emissions control, which is costly.
Emissions accumulate over time. Thus the tension is between foregoing current period consumption
to reduce emissions versus having higher current period consumption but high pollution stocks in the
future.
Two primary results emerge from our analysis. If emissions control is perfectly reversible (no
sunk capital), then the faster one is learning, the lower current emissions should be. Thus learning
2and emissions control are complements, not substitutes. In the case where emission control
investments, once made, become sunk costs, then how learning affects current period emissions turns
on the extent to which learning can increase the value of control capital.
There is a considerable literature on the effect on infomation acquisition on developing
irreplaceable environmental assets (such as flooding the Grand Canyon). A basic result, initially
demonstrated by Arrow and Fisher [1974], is that there is an information value in deferring
irreversible actions. Absent from this literature is a consideration of the effect of the rate of
information acquisition and the tension between irreversibilities in environmental effects and the sunk
cost nature of investments to protect the environment. 2 This paper addresses both of these issues.
The next section of the paper reviews some important contributions to this literature,
including quasi-option value and irreversibilities in investment as well as the literature on decision-
making when learning is taking place. The subsequent sections presents our model of optimal
regulation, focusing on stock effects from the externality. We examine the case of uncertainty in the
disutility of pollution.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Irreversibilities and Stock Externalities
Although the content of this paper is new, the results build on a considerable literature. A
major literature has developed in the area of investment under uncertainty in the presence of
externalities. Arrow and Fisher [1974] initiated much of the work in this area by focusing on a two
period model with uncertainty about the benefits of an environmental asset that is to be exploited
(eg, a canyon flooded to make electricity). With some uncertainty resolved between the two periods
and the impossibility of undoing development of the environmental asset, it turns out to be optimal
2Freeman (1984) and Miller and Lad (1984) consider the case where development yields useful
information. This is a different issue. Perhaps the paper that comes closest to the analysis presented
here is Olson (1990).
3to bias development in favor of preservation of the environmental asset. Henry [1974] published
similar results at the same time. In essence, taking an irreversible action has a cost in terms of
reducing the value of information. Arrow and Fisher [1974] introduced the notion of quasi-option
value, the value of the information gained by waiting before exploiting the environmental asset. Since
then, there has been a considerable literature on irreversibilities and on quasi-option value (eg, see
Fisher and Hanemann, 1987, 1990; Freeman, 1984; Olson, 1990; Conrad 1980; and Miller and Lad,
1984). Of course there is a large literature in finance on option value. In particular, a number of
recent papers concern the optimal timing of capital investments (eg, oil field development) when
learning is taking place (eg, oil field exploration); see Paddock et al. (1988).
Another related literature, primarily from the early 1970's concerns optimal growth in the
presence of environmental externalities, particularly stock externalities. This was a natural extension
of the optimal growth models that were popular in the 1960's and early 1970's. An important and
characteristic paper in this genre is that of Keeler et al (1971). In that paper a simple optimal growth
model is posited where utility is a function of consumption and a stock of pollution. Optimal paths
for accumulation of capital and pollution are developed for several different types of pollution
control. Other papers of this type include Plourde (1972), d'Arge and Kogiku (1973), Smith (1972),
Plourde and Yeung (1989) and Forster (1973). Cropper (1976) also considers such a model of
optimal growth but focuses on catastrophic environmental effects—the ultimate in irreversibilities.
B. Learning
The typical approach to including learning in models of irreversibility is to posit a two or three
period model where uncertainty changes from one period to the next. Miller and Lad [1984] use a
two period model with an ex ante probability distribution on period i benefits (b
t
) of f(b,,b-,). After
observing period one benefits, the ex post marginal distribution is obtained: ["(b^b-,^,). While this
is clearly learning, we need a way to parameterize the rate of learning so that the effects of the rate
4of learning can be deduced. Jones and Ostroy [1984], Olson [1990] and Marshak and Miyasawa
[1968] provide such a framework through the concept of an ordering on information structures.
Starting with a set of states of nature and an informative message, an information structure consists
of a prior on the probabilities of receiving specific messages, along with a conditional probability on
states of nature, given a specific message. Of two information structures with the same prior on
states of nature, the one that has the greater variability in terms of possible posteriors is viewed as
being "more informative." This is equivalent to the more informative structure yielding a higher
attainable expected utility when the consumption bundle depends on the state of nature (Jones and
Ostroy, 1984). Thus if two learning processes yield two comparable information structures, then the
structure that is more informative corresponds to greater learning.
To quantify this concept of learning further, suppose there is a set of possible states of nature,
indexed by s=l,. . .,S. Furthermore, suppose there is a finite set, Y, of possible "messages" containing
information on the state of nature. Suppose the prior on receiving particular messages is q
(dimension equal to the size of Y) and the conditional probability on states of nature (after the
message yeY has been received) is 7t(y). We use the term "prior" to refer to a probability distribution
before the message is received and posterior to refer to distributions assuming a message has been
received. Let II be a matrix with columns consisting of ir(y) with a different column for each y. Thus
II has S rows and the same number of columns as members of Y. (H,q) is an information structure.
A first goal is to develop an economically relevant ordering on information structures. A standard
definition of the comparative value of information is provided by Jones and Ostroy [1984] (see also
Laffont, 1989):
Defn. Given a finite set A of actions (chosen after the message y becomes known), a set of states of
nature S and utility u defined on A x S, (Hq) is more valuable than (II',q') iffor all bounded utility
functions,
Ev ^odl^W"^'5)] ^Ev ^maxa^[E^O0w(<7,s) (1)
Thus with actions chosen after the state of nature is revealed, an information structure that always
has a higher expected utility is a more valuable structure. Blackwell's theorem connects this notion
of value with variability in beliefs:
Theorem (Blackwell, 1953): Given two information structures, (H q) and (W, q'), (U, q) is more
valuable than (W, q') if there exists a non-negative matrix M, with columns summing to 1 (i.e., a
Markov matrix) such that
IT = UM and q = Mq' (2)
It follows that for (2) to hold, priors on states of nature must be the same:
n =Uq = IIV- (3 )
Using the terminology preferred by Jones and Ostroy [1984], (II, q) is the structure with the higher
variability in beliefs (i.e., variability in posteriors on states-of-nature). Note that the extremes of
variability are in the two structures: i) jr(y) = rr for all y where ir is the prior on states of nature and
is also the posterior, no matter what message was received; ii) rc(y) = e where e is a vector of O's and
l's and implies that the message resolved all uncertainty. The first of these has the minimum amount
of variability, the second the maximum. Jones and Ostroy (1984) establish that condition (2) defines
a partial ordering on information structures.
A restriction on the set of comparable (using Blackwell's theorem) information structures that
has proved useful in examining learning (Jones and Ostroy, 1984; Olson, 1990) is the set of star-
shaped beliefs:
Defn: The information structure (Hq) is a star-shaped spreading of (II', q') if i) Ik{ = Wq' = k;
ii) q — q '; and Hi) there exists <r X
x
z I such that
n'(y) = X
y
n(y) + (l-X.
y
)n (4)
Applying Blackwell's theorem implies that in the above definition, (II, q) is more valuable than (II',
q')-
As an example suppose you can receive one of three messages indicating whether the state
of nature is 1, 2 or 3. We thus assume that number of possible messages equals the number of
possible states-of-nature, which need not be the case. A message that conveyed the maximum
amount of information would resolve all uncertainty on the state of nature. If the message is too
noisy to contain any information, then the posterior on states of nature is the same as the prior. This
is illustrated in Figure 1 where the simplex of probabilities on states of nature is shown. The prior
is it. The set of posteriors associated with a star-shaped spreading of beliefs, spread all the way out
to the vertices, is shown by the three lines radiating out from i. Perfect learning would move you
to one of the three vertices following receipt of the message. Less perfect learning would move you
to one of the three points marked with circles. Even less perfect learning would move you to one
of the three points marked with x's after receiving the message.
The advantage of representing learning by this star-shaped spreading of beliefs is that the
process can be parameterized by the X
y
in equation (4). The disadvantage is that we have eliminated
perfectly legitimate and orderable learning processes (emanating from k in Figure 1).
III. UNCERTAIN POLLUTION DAMAGE
The purpose of this section is to develop a stochastic model of the joint generation of
pollution and consumption goods. Pollution accumulates. The basic issue of concern is how much
pollution to emit today and how those optimal emissions are affected by the rate of learning. Today's
emissions can be reduced but at a cost in terms of today's consumption. We focus on the
7comparative statics of optimal current-period emissions with respect to the rate of learning.
Decisions on emissions are made at discrete points in time. Utility is affected by consumption,
which is influenced by emissions, and the stock of pollution. The stock of pollution evolves through
emissions augmenting the stock. The way in which pollution enters the utility function is uncertain,
and the decision-maker has a prior on this uncertainty. Furthermore, this prior is updated over time
through learning. Thus the decision maker is always faced with the decision to emit now and enjoy
the resulting consumption, but perhaps create future disutility, versus reducing emissions now,
foregoing consumption but enjoying lower stocks of pollution later. The thinking is that if, later on,
pollution turns out to be less serious, emissions can always be increased.
We will consider two cases. One involves emissions being proportional to consumption.
Emissions can be reduced by reducing consumption, diverting output to control or emitting less by
producing less. The other case requires investment in emission control capital. Production must be
diverted when the initial investment in control capital is made; however the control capital can then
be costlessly used in subsequent periods to control pollution. If later on pollution turns out to be
less of a problem, there may be excess pollution control capital. First we set up the general model.
A. The General Model
Let the representative consumer's utility per unit time be a function of the stock of the
externality, P, and consumption, C. We thus make utility a function of P and C: U(P,C). Assume
U is convex, Uc is positive and U P , UCP , U PP and Ucc are negative
3
. Thus P is a bad and C is a
good. Let emissions be E. The relationship between emissions and consumption will be detailed later.
The stock of the externality evolves according to
AP = rE (5)
3
Negativity of UCP is equivalent to having higher marginal disutility of pollution at higher
consumption levels. Thus the bigger a consumer you are, the more "disrupting" is pollution.
8Clearly r>0. Note that there is no natural decay of P, although that would be easy to include. Some
variables in our model will be stochastic, taking on discrete values depending on a realization of the
state-of-nature, which is unknown. Let Tt(t) be a vector of probabilities, (n v . . .,tc s), with ^(t) being
the probability at t that the state-of-nature is i. Obviously 2 ic
{
— 1. In our case, we are unsure
exactly how the pollution stock affects utility. We represent this uncertainty by writing utility as
U(6|P,C) where 6; depends on the realized state-of-nature. Assume i>j =» 6
L
> 6:>0.
We now turn to characterize the learning process. We assume that the set of possible
messages, Y, is of the same size as the set of possible states-of-nature. Each message, y, e Y, is a
noisy message that the state of nature is i. The less noisy ys is, the more certainty there will be, ex
post (ie, ex post the message), that the state of nature is i. Furthermore, we assume the probability,
q, associated with the vector y is the same as the prior on the states of nature. Thus if one's prior
on state i is tE
s
(i.e., the probability that the state of nature is i), then the probability of receiving y ;
is also i
;
: q = k. For example, consider the case of global warming where there is uncertainty over
just how serious the problem is. Suppose there are two states of nature, B and L, for global warming
being a big problem and global warming being a little problem. Supple the prior one states is (p, 1-
p). Our assumption is that learning (R&D) may result in one of two messages, one suggesting B, the
other suggesting L. And the probability that learning will suggest B is p and is the probability that
learning suggests L is 1-p.
Furthermore, we characterize learning as a star-shaped spreading of beliefs with learning
parameter X. Let (II, q) be the information structure at t. If ir(t) = Ilq = q is a prior on states of
nature at time t, then learning can move in S possible directions (see Figure 1). The ith column of
n is
7i' = (l-X)^(r) + A^'
- A.7i=[e'-7c(0]A (6)
where e 1 is a vector of zeros except with a one in the i lh position. Another way of viewing the vector
k 1 in (6) is as the posterior on states of nature, given that learning proceded in direction i. With
reference to Fig. 1, this might correspond to point D. With A.=0, no learning occurs. With X= l,
movement to the vertices of the simplex (perfect information) occurs. 4 Thus Ae[0,l].
It should be mentioned that this description of learning, while intuitively attractive, is quite
restrictive. Not only have we restricted the set of messages but the way in which learning modifies
probabilities on states of nature. Despite this, the characterization seems fairly realistic in that a prior
on states of nature "moves" at some speed (X) towards perfect knowledge-the vertices of the simplex.
We now turn to specifying the dynamic structure of the problem. Assume there are three
time periods, 1, 2, and 3. Decisions are made in time periods 1 and 2. In time period 1, the choice
must be made regarding emissions, E, given a prior probability distribution on states-of-nature. After
that choice is made learning occurs and a posterior probability distribution on states-of-nature result.
The stock also evolves. In time period 2 another choice is made regarding emissions. Then the stock
of pollution evolves again. Utility in the third time period is a function of the stock of pollution only
V(P). This function, V(P), can be interpreted in two ways. One is that the world has three periods
and nothing occurs after the third period. The other is that V(P) represents the net present value
of maximum attainable utility over the indefinite future, starting with pollution stock P. Either way,
our model is the same. In the second case, V(P) depends on U(P,C) and in principal can be
computed from U(P,C). Similar to U, assume VP <0, Vpp<0. Thus V is convex.
Denote by H(n,P) the maximum utility attainable in period 2, given (rc,P) at the beginning
4The information structure associated with the transition is (II,q) where k =q = ITq, IT
I]
= 7t
1
-t-( l-7i,)A.
and H^ = 7Ti(l -X) for i^j.
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of period 2. Denote by J(7t,P) the maximum utility attainable in period 1, given (tt,P) at the
beginning of period 1. Let the period 1-2 discount rate be p. We now consider our two cases.
B. No Stock Effect in Pollution Control
Emissions will be assumed proportional to consumption. Emissions can be reduced, but only
by reducing consumption. Without loss of generality, we assume C = E. We can now write H(P,tc),
the maximium utility attainable in period 2, as
H(P,n) =maxj£ nW(b
t
,P,E2)\ (7)
where
W(5PP,E2) = U{&J>,E2) * V[6,(P*rE2)]
Similarly, we can write the maximum utility attainable in period 1, in terms of H:
J(n,P,X)=maxjj(ii 1 P,X,E l)=Y, ^(S^^ + PE qjH[P+rEvn^
where Tij = Tl + X(e J - ll)
i
Although by assumption q=Tt, for clarity we have retained both variables to distinguish between the
events "being in state of nature i" and "learning progressing in the direction of d." Of course
Ei Tr i = Zi clj
= l- Clearly E 2*(P,k) satisfies
11
£ 7i:^£(S,,P,£2V0. (9)
i
The first order condition for an optimal E/ is
Je(k,P,X,E;)=0 (10)
Totally differentiating this with respect to X and E, yields
JEX dX+ JEEdE l =0
dEl^_ JEX
dX jJEE
Furthermore,
(11)
From (8) it is clear that
JEE (7r,P,X,^)=E 7l l Ucc + P r'E qjHpp[P+rElt nq (12)
/7p/,(P,t0=£ Tr i.[^)/)(6 t,P)JrI2 ) +^£(5 i , JP,£2 )-^] (13)
which can be shown to be negative by totally differentiating (9) or through convexity arguments.
Thus JEE <0. Differentiating eqn (8) we obtain
JEX (7i,P,A,£;>Pr£<7,X (fil-ntH^lP + rEirt. (14)
i l<s
12
But from (7),
Hp [P,n] =£ n.Wpib^E^n)] 05)
which implies (for /<s)
HPK -Wp[bpPX2\ +^-£^£[S,P,£2*]. (16)
But from (9),
dE
2
K
l
WJi6pP,E£
d7l
< E^WEE^i'P>^
Combining (16) and (17) yields
£ *,W,Jii,P.G\
(17)
HPn IP, k] = Wp[b t,P,E;] - «,Wy8p /»,E,*] ~ • < 18>
E kFeJ&pP.e;]
This can be combined with (14) to yield JEv Unfortunately, it is not easy to sign this. One
complication is that third order derivatives of W may be needed. We can derive results to a second-
order approximation; i.e. assuming derivatives of the utility functions of third order and higher are
zero.
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Prop. 1 In a two state model with uncertainty in damage from the pollution stock, an increase in the
rate of learning decreases cuirent period emissions, to a second order approximation of utility.
Proof: It is clear from eqn (11) that the sign of dE,/dX is the same as the sign of JEv We thus need
to show JEA is negative. In our case J EA can be written with (ji, 1-tt) as the probabilities for the two
states:
= Prn(l-n){HpJP+rE;,n
l]-HPv[P + rE*u iz2]} (19)
whose sign is the same as the term in braces. To sign this, define a = (-l,l) and f(ct) = H P7r [P,Tr + cca]
with P = P + rE!* and a e R+ . Since rc
1
= [n+ X(l-iz), (1-X) (1-*)] and ji 2 = [(I-X)ti, (1-rc) + Xn],
clearly f(0)-f(X) is the term in braces in (19). If f'(cc) is positive for all a, ()<.a^X<.\, the proposition
will be proved. Differentiating f(a) we obtain (remembering that tij + tc^I) 5 :
/(<*) =
df df $E2
dn dE' dn
dn
da
WpE -{n\-a)WlPE
(n\-a)WJ6
l9P,EZl
W,EE
w,PE
w,
WE[b vPyE£ {-1}
EE
5Note that when a changes, n changes; when n changes, E2
* changes; when E2 * changes slightly,
H and W are unaffected (by the envelope theorem) but H,»n , WP and WE (and thus f) do change.
14
w
-^{[(l-X)(l-iz) + a][n[-a] + l}WE [6 v P,E;] ^
™EE
In the above, our assumption on a second-order approximation of utility means third-order derivatives
of W are zero. By assumptions on U and V and the definition of W, we know W
E(5 <0. From (9)
and the fact that W
EiJ <0, we have WL [6 1 ,P,E 2*]>0. Thus f'(a)>0 and the proposition is proved.J
The interpretation of this proposition is straightforward. If you are uncertain about how
pollution affects your utility but will know better tomorrow, then it is better to under-emit today,
perhaps correcting your "mistake" tomorrow.
It is appropriate to compare this result to the results of Arrow and Fisher (1974). Their
results indicate that when A.>0, there should be more of an effort to avoid irreversibilities than when
X=0: dE/dA.<0. This is, in fact, our result.
The policy implications of this result are quite significant. Emissions can either be directly
controlled by reducing their level or indirectly controlled by increasing X through investment in R&D.
This result does not support the view that if learning is progressing rapidly then controls should be
deferred until more is known. Learning and pollution control are complements, not substitutes.
Another way to look at this is the less you emit, the greater the value of the information you receive.
Thus receiving greater amounts of information enhances the value of undcremitting.
C. Investment in Emission Control Capital
In the last section we saw that learning decreases current emissions because of the stock
nature of the externality. We now turn to the case where there is a type of irreversibility in pollution
control. Once you invest in pollution control capital, that capital is useful for all time. However, it
is useful only for pollution control and cannot later be "un-invested." This may be a bit extreme to
assume control capital does not depreciate. However, it is a useful approximation, and is not
15
unreasonable for some investments like R&D in pollution control.
As in the model developed in the last section of the paper, net emissions cause the pollution
stock to evolve, according to eqn (5). The main difference is that instead of emissions being the
decision variable, investment in emission control capital (I) is the decision variable. This investment
is costly but infinitely lived. Net emission are defined as E -K where K is the stock of emission
control capital and E is gross emission (before control) and is time invariant. Thus the pollution
stock evolves as
I r(E -K) for K,E
(2l)
{ otherwise
Utility is as before a function of consumption and the stock of pollution, U(6
i
P,C), where 6
is state-dependent. If Y is gross output, then C=
Y
-I. Since Y only enters the utility function and
is time invariant, without loss of generality we can define C^-I.
Thus eqn (7) can be rewritten as
#(/>,*,*) =max|£ nW(d
iy
P,K,I
2)\ (22)
where
W(b,,P,KJ
2)
= U(b
i
P,-l
2
)*V(b
l
[P*r(E -K-I
2)})
Note that W is convex in (P,K,I2). Thus H is convex in (P,K) 6 . Eqn (8) can be rewritten as
6
If g(z,a) is convex in (z,a) then g*(a) = max, g(z,a) is convex in a (Mangasarian and Rosen
1964).
"
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J(n,P,K,X) =max|/(7i:,P,iW
1)
s£ *,-W^ "A)
+ p£ ^p + K^-^-z^Ar+^^i (23)
where 7T; = IT + A(e y - 7l)
i
Clearly I 2*(P,k,Tr) satisfies
Y^TZ.Wfb^Kj;)^. (24)
i
The first order condition for an optimal I,* is
7/ (Tt,P,ife,X,/1*)=0 (25)
Totally differentiating this with respect to X and I, yields
J^dX+Jjjdl^O
5l = -^ (26)
Jn is negative since J is the sum of two convex functions (U and H) and it is thus easily shown that
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J is convex in I. Differentiating eqn (23) we obtain
3i—Y.*iuc-^L9frE,-B^ (27)
and
-J5T&|[P + r(£ -* - I[\K + /;, it^j
.
(28)
From (22) we have
Hjn[(P,K,n) = Wji6 pP9K,l£+^ yE* iWljL6pP,K,l£ for j=P,K. (29)
And from (24),
di;
_
npjL^p.Kj;] m
d%l £ n iWij.6pP,K,l£
Eqn (28-30) can be combined to yield an expression for J IA . As before, it is not easy to sign.
However, results are obtainable for a restricted case:
Prop 2: In a two state model with uncertainty in damage from the pollution stock and emission control
through a stock of control capital, then the effect of learning on current period investment in control
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capital is ambiguous. Assume a second-order approximation of utility. If at an optimum the marginal
value of control capital in future periods increases sufficiently rapidly in the pollution stock, then it will
be optimal to under-invest in control capital. Alternatively, if that marginal value is sufficiently small,
it will be desirable to over control.
Proof: The sign of dI,7cU is the same as the sign of J 1A (from eqn 26). For the two states-of-the-
world case, eqn (28) becomes
Jlx = -^rii(\-n){rHp^P,k^ l]-HK \:PX^]
-rH
p7i[PXn 2l+HKii[PXn 2]}. (31)
As in Prop. 1, define a=(-l,l) and f(a) = rH
1
,
7r
[P,K,7i' + aa] - H^fP.KV + cca] with a e R+ ,
P= P + r(E -K-Ij*) and K=K+I,\ Since f(0)-f(A.) is the term in braces in eqn. (31), f '(a) positive for
all a, O^a^A.^1 implies that dI,7dX is positive and similarly f'(a) negative implies dI,*/dX is negative.
Differentiating f(a), using eqn (29), yields:
f'W =
dl
^rli + Jf
dL diz dn
dn
da
&;
dn
rWfl - W„- (it | - a) (rWpp - WpK) *
jrWpp -WpK)
(itl-a)
9£
dn
[rWPI-Wri] + [rWpp-WpJPP " PW
1 M1 / 1 \
-(Tii -a)
7ij - a
')
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dn
<MV1 +MlKl KP
(7i[-a)
(32)
where M{b VP,KJV I2) = W{b vP + r(EQ - K -I^K + IV I2)
and where our assumption on a second-order approximation to utility allows us to set third-order
derivatives to zero. Because W
Ii5
>0, then W
I
[S
1
,P,K,I2*]<0 and thus (from eqn 30), dl 2*/d7i<0.
MK = -rWP+WK is the marginal value to the future of a unit of control capital today. M^ is
negative and M^ is positive. The expression with probabilities in brackets in eqn (32) is positive.
If MH dominates dI 17dX>0; if M^ dominates, dI 1 */clX<0. Thus dl^/dX can be made positive by
making M,^ sufficiently small and negative by making M^ sufficiently large.J
To understand this proposition, it is important to understand the mechanism whereby learning
acquires value. Learning resolves uncertainty in the effect of pollution on future utility.
Alternatively, think of learning as resolving the uncertainty in the benefits of pollution control which
are, of course, directly related to future pollution levels. The higher the marginal benefits of
pollution control, the greater the potential value of information about it. Thus at an optimum, an
increase in the rate of learning will induce actions that increase the marginal benefit of pollution
control. This is why in Prop. 1, increased learning induced reduced emissions since lower emissions
result in lower pollution stocks and thus a higher marginal utility of emissions control.
Similarly, here the value of emissions control is what yields the value of learning. Thus if one
increases the rate of learning, one would expect a marginal change in emission control that yields an
increase in the marginal value of emission contorl. M K is the marginal value of a unit of emission
control capital. MK is increasing in P and decreasing in I 2. The greater the pollution stock, the
20
greater the marginal payoff from emissions control. Also, the greater second period investment in
pollution control, the lower the marginal value of current period investments in control. If M,^
dominates, then increasing P increases the value of learning so higher rates of learning call for more
P and thus less I,. The reverse is true if M^ dominates.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored the implications of learning on optimal control of emissions of a stock
externality. The issue is significant theoretically as well as of utmost importance empirically,
particularly for the case of global warming.
There is no clear accepted wisdom on this type of problem. One view is that because
pollution is accumulating we should tend to over-control now, while we arc learning. The risks of
getting too much pollution outweigh the risks of spending too much on control. This position hinges
less on the fact that learning is taking place than on the fact that there is a reversibility. The
alternative view is that because we are learning rapidly, we may as well put control off until
tommorrow when we will know much more about the problem.
There arc two results in this paper. One is that when emissions control is perfectly reversible
(no sunk capital-control levels can be raised or lower at any time), then the fact that one is learning
will cause the optimal level of current emissions to be lower. Because of the stock effects of
pollution, it is in fact prudent to err on the side of under-emission.
However, the result is more ambiguous when there is a stock effect both in pollution
accumulation and in emission control, through irreversible investments in control capital. The
direction of bias in today's emission control capital investment decision depends on how learning will
effect, ex post, the value of an investment in control capital. If learning may result in dramatically
larger or smaller marginal values for a unit of control capital investment, then one would be reducing
21
the value of learning by excessively investing in control today. This leads to under-control relative
to the no learning case. On the other hand, if learning has less payoff in terms of the value of
control capital investment, then the irreversibility in pollution dominates and we have our first result.
Clearly, there are a number of possible future directions for this work, including making the
results more general and adding different forms of uncertainty. Of course, definitive answers to these
questions for specific policy applications require an empirical implementation of these models,
involving more structure and data than are found here. Hopefully this work will motivate such
empirical investigations.
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r-K+c I S4e.+ € i
^igure 1. Star-shaped spreading of beliefs from it.
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